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important in!ection point in CIA history. On the one hand, the agents of America’s secret government 
worked even harder to watch and control the young people who protested against their bipolar view 
of the world. President Lyndon Johnson pressured the CIA to widen existing programs and investigate 
the possible foreign links of many di"erent antiwar groups and individuals. Helms responded by cre-
ating a program known as Operation CHAOS, a counterintelligence program run by the Agency and 
directed at American dissidents, even though these domestic actions directly violated the CIA’s charter. 
Soon, President Richard Nixon demanded that the CIA and other secret agencies expand these pro-
grams against the Americans he considered the nation’s enemies. Johnson’s paranoia about domestic 
dissidents and his illegal programs to combat them – as extensive as they were – soon came to seem 
mild compared to his successor’s obsessive concern with dissenters and his endorsement of systematic 
law-breaking to investigate and punish them.
While government o#cials worked in secret to intimidate the administration’s young opponents, 
members of the press grew more determined to unearth proof of what they believed were real gov-
ernment conspiracies against democracy. The chain of events that began with the Ramparts exposé 
– the Operation CHAOS programs against domestic dissidents, the Nixon administration’s anti-subver-
sive program known as the Huston Plan, and the police discovery of the CIA-a#liated burglars at the 
Watergate o#ce building – culminated in the extensive congressional and journalistic investigations 
of the intelligence community in 1975.
The investigators on Frank Church’s Senate committee exposed many CIA abuses: assassination 
plots, the covert use of reporters and religious groups for espionage purposes, and Operation CHAOS, 
among others. But they produced relatively little new information about the CIA’s in$ltration of the 
NSA. Paget’s book helps to $ll this gap, and to remind us of the consequences when we fail to keep 
watch over our secret agencies.
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Does torture work?, by John W. Schiemann, New York, Oxford University Press, 2016, 315 
pp., $34.95 (hardback), ISBN 978-0190262365
In this book, John W. Schiemann asks an important but controversial question, and he acknowledges 
early on that some readers might wonder whether it is appropriate or ethical to even ask it: does tor-
ture work? He argues convincingly that the question should be asked, because although many would 
protest that torture is wrong whether or not it is e"ective, ‘Even most people who favor using torture 
would agree not to use it if they thought it did not work’ (xi).
Schiemann’s conclusion—that it does not ‘work’ in the sense of being an e"ective way to gain useful 
information—will be no surprise to those familiar with the large and growing literature on torture in 
recent years, both in the $eld of intelligence studies,1 and in other $elds.2 His $ndings are similar to 
those reached by other major recent studies, such as by Rejali and the Intelligence Science Board.3
But his approach is di"erent from that taken by most others who have looked at this question. He 
argues that real-world, empirical data is not su#cient to answer the question of whether torture—or 
what has come to be known since the 9/11 attacks as ‘enhanced interrogation techniques (EITs)’—
actually work. Instead, he uses game theory to analyze the problem, by $rst building a model of what 
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he calls ‘interrogational torture’, and then ‘solving’ the game by determining its equilibrium—the most 
stable combination of actions, resulting after each actor has made rational, self-interested choices. The 
equilibrium of such a game, Schiemann writes, provides a prediction of what would happen in real life.
I am not persuaded by Schiemann’s argument that there is insu#cient data available to determine 
empirically whether or not torture can be e"ective (38). In addition, I think it is likely that many political 
scientists and other scholars would take issue with Schiemann’s claim that ‘the preeminent vehicles for 
making reasoned and logical arguments are formal logic and mathematics’ (6). There has been a long 
debate over the relative value of quantitative and qualitative methods in the social sciences, and a dis-
cussion of that debate is beyond the scope of this review. But because most of the current literature on 
the e#cacy of torture relies on other methodologies such as case studies, historical analysis or policy 
analysis, it is useful to have this book take a fresh look at the question.
The author’s bias is clear, and Schiemann appears to know his answer even before he begins—that 
torture is both wrong and ine"ective, even when practiced by presumably well-meaning government 
o#cials; and if only we could convince those o#cials and the public that torture is ine"ective, we might 
convince them to do away with it. But his analysis is interesting, even though readers unfamiliar with 
game theory may $nd some sections of the book a little hard going.
In chapter 2, Schiemann provides a quick tour of examples of torture from the past, including the 
Spanish Inquisition, the use of water torture on convicts in Alabama in 1881, and American prisoners 
of war in World War II and Korea. He argues that torture does not always include the tools we usually 
think of belonging in a medieval dungeon, such as the rack and red-hot pokers, but instead throughout 
history torture has often been done in such a way as to not leave lasting physical evidence. So it was 
with the American enhanced interrogation techniques after the 9/11 attacks, he argues, making the 
case that such EITs constitute torture. Supporters of such techniques will of course disagree with that 
characterization, but his detailed descriptions of such interrogations do make persuasive evidence that 
they should be considered torture.
Schiemann challenges what he describes as the commonplace notion that torture eventually works 
on everyone—that everyone has a breaking point. He points out that history clearly indicates this is 
not so, because there have been a number of cases in which individuals such as Senator John McCain 
and Navy Commander Jeremiah Denton in the Vietnam War have been tortured and given up no use-
ful information (33,78). Schiemann devotes less attention to the opposite side of the argument—that 
history also shows that at least in some cases, victims of torture do provide valuable information. He 
does give at least one example of where just the threat of torture was e"ective: the case in 2002, of a 
German man who had kidnapped and murdered a boy, and who $nally revealed the location of the 
body after being threatened with torture (172–177). But he argues that even if torture works rarely, it 
remains unacceptable (41).
Although the book avoids discussion of the ethical, legal, or other considerations concerning torture, 
it is di#cult to avoid such issues entirely. For example, Schiemann notes that the CIA, which presum-
ably would want to know whether techniques such as enhanced interrogation work, has evidently 
never conducted a study of their e"ectiveness. Part of the reason why no such study was done, the 
CIA wrote, is ‘Federal policy on the protection of human subjects’ (34). The CIA was able, however, to 
provide examples of intelligence gained through interrogation that it claims had disrupted terrorist 
plots or led to the capture of terrorists.4 This leaves a paradox by which a federal agency was allowed to 
use coercive interrogation techniques, but cannot study the e"ectiveness of those techniques because 
such a study could harm those who had been subjected to them.
In chapter 3, Schiemann develops what he calls an ‘ideal model’ of interrogational torture, building 
on the arguments of Alan Dershowitz, Richard Posner, and others who have called for the use of torture 
under certain extreme circumstances. Under this model torture must only be used as a last resort, con-
ducted by specially trained o#cers who are subject to controls and oversight over what they can and 
cannot do (47). He describes what is known about the torture—or enhanced interrogation—program 
used under the Bush administration after 9/11, and $nds that the program follows the ideal model 
fairly closely.
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The central part of Schiemann’s argument comes in the middle chapters of the book, where he uses 
game theory to test what results such an ideal model torture program might provide. To do this, he 
builds a game involving two players—an Interrogator and a Detainee—and ‘plays’ the game by logically 
analyzing the sequence of actions each player would take in an actual interrogation situation. This is 
similar to the familiar Prisoners’ Dilemma, in which police interrogate two di"erent suspects separately 
and succeed in getting a confession, because the suspects calculate that they are each better o" if they 
confess or rat out their accomplice than they would be if they refused to talk, but their buddy confesses. 
His detailed analysis—much of which would be primarily of interest to those with a background in game 
theory—concludes that interrogators are not likely to get very useful information through torture.
He $nds that torture is no more likely to produce valuable information than would interrogation 
without torture; and moreover, that although increasing the brutality of torture does increase the 
likelihood of gaining valuable information, it also increases the likelihood that the torturer will gain 
ambiguous or false information, as detainees lie and make false confessions, especially under leading 
questioning. In addition, the logic of the torture ‘game’ indicates that interrogators will have incentives 
to try more and more torture, and more brutal methods of torture, producing a slippery slope.
The debate over the e"ectiveness of torture is not likely to be settled anytime soon, especially 
because senior, respected government o#cials continue to argue that enhanced interrogation does 
work. Former CIA and NSA Director Michael Hayden, for example, argues in a recent book that ‘No one 
with any knowledge of this program [EIT] doubted that it had provided unique, actionable intelligence’.5 
And former CIA spokesman Bill Harlow says that ‘the enhanced interrogation program that we utilized 
on a handful of top terrorists absolutely, beyond any doubt, produced vital intelligence that helped 
keep America safe’.6
It can be di#cult to argue against senior o#cials such as Hayden and Harlow, as their statements 
often imply that their views are informed by secret information unavailable to the public. In the end, 
the argument is likely to be only settled with empirical facts, and not through a game theoretical 
analysis. But this book and the broader public and scholarly record strongly suggest that there is no 
simple answer to the question. It appears that torture can sometimes—although perhaps not very 
often—be e"ective, and it can sometimes fail completely. But in most cases it falls somewhere in the 
middle, where even if some useful information appears to have been gained, the torturer is not likely 
to ever know if that was all the information that was available, or whether the victim was still holding 
out something even more important or useful. If that is in fact the record of torture, then Schiemann 
is right that it does not work.
Notes
1.  Harries, “The Incoherence of the only serious argument for torture”; Duke and Puyvelde, “What Science Can Teach 
Us.”
2.  For example, Hajjar, “Does Torture Work?” P$"ner, “The E#cacy of Coercive Interrogation,” and Rumney, “Is Coercive 
Interrogation of Terrorist Suspects E"ective?”
3.  While Schiemann cites Darius Rejali’s well-known book, I could not $nd that he cites the equally important study 
by the Intelligence Science Board, Educing Information.
4.  U.S. Senate, Report of the Senate Select Committee, 126–127.
5.  Hayden, Playing to the Edge, 217.
6.  PBS NewsHour, “Is torture e"ective for gathering intelligence?”
Bibliography
Duke, Misty C., and Damien Van Puyvelde. “What Science Can Teach Us about “Enhanced Interrogation” International Journal 
of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 30, no. 2 (2017): 310–339.
Hajjar, Lisa. “Does Torture Work? A Sociolegal Assessment of the Practice in Historical and Global Perspective.” Annual Review 
of Law and Social Science 5 (2009): 311–345.
Harries, Emma. “The Incoherence of the Only Serious Argument for Torture.” Intelligence and National Security 32, no. 2 
(2017): 161–178.
Hayden, Michael V. Playing to the Edge: American Intelligence in the Age of Terror. New York: Penguin, 2016.
INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY  1041
Intelligence Science Board. Educing Information: Interrogation: Science and Art, Foundations for the Future, Phase 1 Report. 
Washington, DC: National Defense Intelligence College Press, 2006.
PBS NewsHour. “Is Torture E"ective for Gathering Intelligence?—Part 2.” Aired December 10, 2014. https://www.pbs.org/
newshour/bb/torture-e"ective-gathering-intelligence/
P$"ner, P. “The E#cacy of Coercive Interrogation.” In Examining Torture: Empirical Studies of State Repression, edited by Tracy 
Lightcap and James P. P$"ner, 127–158. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.
Rejali, Darius. Torture and Democracy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007.
Rumney, Philip, N. S. “Is Coercive Interrogation of Terrorist Suspects E"ective? A Response to Bagaric and Clarke.” University 
of San Francisco Law Review 40 (2006): 479–513.
U.S. Senate. Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Detention 
and Interrogation Program, December 9, 2014.
Erik Dahl
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA
 ejdahl@nps.edu
© 2017 Erik Dahl
https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2017.1357275 
 
Relentless strike: the secret history of Joint Special Operations Command, by Sean 
Naylor, New York, St. Martin’s Gri#n, 2015, 560 pp., US$18.99 (hardback),  
ISBN 978-1250105471
Americans by and large have lost the connection with what war is all about – even as their armed forces 
and robots roam the globe blasting away at enemies both real and imagined in a desperate and fruitless 
attempt to police the chaotic international system.
Fifteen years and several trillion dollars later with two failed wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the public 
chooses to avert its gauze from these unmitigated disasters. But if the wars are conveniently forgotten 
in the public consciousness, there remains a romantic and wistful attachment to America’s warriors 
parachuting behind enemy lines in their heroic e"orts to rescue prisoners or simply kill the country’s 
enemies. Our movie screens and televisions are alive with tales that chronicle the heroic exploits of our 
modern day commandos. The public loves these stories – perhaps in a vain attempt to convince itself 
that something good came out of the post-9/11 era of irregular wars.
Sean Naylor’s book Relentless Strike is the latest and certainly one of the most comprehensive stories 
that feed the public’s demand for and interest in America’s warrior elite. Naylor, an accomplished and 
experienced journalist, has assembled an exhaustive, detailed, and approachable history that chronicles 
the evolution of the Defense Department’s special forces empire. Today, these special forces e"ectively 
constitute yet another arm of our military services and have become the executive branch’s preferred 
instrument in conducting the country’s global policing missions. Naylor’s prose is vivid, breathless, 
and meticulously detailed as he builds his stories of bravery and commitment of these forces over the 
decades.
While, Naylor may, indeed, be feeding the public’s appetite for a good, action-packed story that 
draws heavily on interviews with the participants in actual operations over the decades – the more 
interesting story (at least for this reviewer) implicitly emerges through his pages. That story is the growth 
of the Special Forces’ bureaucratic empire as the SOF community desperately searched for traction and 
attention from their military colleagues and political masters. The SOF community eventually succeeded 
beyond its wildest dreams in Iraq and Afghanistan – perhaps to the detriment of the country and its 
misguided conceptions of war in the modern era.
Today’s SOF empire grew out of the smoldering wreckage of the Desert One $asco, all those many 
years ago, during the Iran hostage crisis. Naylor traces the history of the what would become the 
Joint Special Operations Command, or JSOC, from this period and its evolution from a mission mostly 
